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CHRISTIANITY AND THE (MODEST) RULE OF LAW

'
**
David A. Skeel, Jr. & William J Stuntz
INTRODUCTION

Legality is the central commitment of American government.

Ours is a country where law rules, and law rules everyone--Iaw's em
pire extends to governors as well as those they govern, as our massive
body of constitutional law attests.

That commitment is supposed to mean five things. First, when

the state deprives one of its citizens of life, liberty, or property, the
deprivation is primarily the consequence of a legal rule, not a discre
tionary choice.

Obviously, discretion exists, and it matters, but the

key policy judgments that lead to prison terms and damages bills
should be made by those who

force

define legal

rules, not by those who

such rules. The second implication follows from the first:

rules in question must have a reasonable measure of specificity.1

en

the

If

state or federal codes made it a crime to "cause harm" or "do wrong,"

and if defendants were convicted and punished for such crimes, the

criminal justice system could not claim to follow the rule of law: such

vague commands do not genuinely command anything. For law to
rule, it must define the line between behavior that is subject to legal

penalty and behavior that isn't-not simply declare that the line ex
ists and leave its definition to law enforcers.

Third, the rules must be defined in advance of the penalized con
duct. Officials cannot target some unpopular person and send her

up the river for behavior that, at the time she engaged in it, was rea
sonably understood to be permissible. Nor can officials gin up the
"crime" after the investigation has begun in order to ensure that they

will have something to prosecute.

S. Samuel Arsht Professor of Corporate Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.

We

are grateful to Steve Goldberg, Seth Kreimer, Steve Mikochik, Ethan Schrum, Ted Seto, the
participants in the University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law's "Law and Relig
ion" symposium, and the participants at a faculty workshop at Cornell Law School for helpful
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Fourth, the law must be the same law in different sorts of
neighborhoods. Some legal wrongs may by their nature be limited by
class, as Anatole France ' s famous line about sleeping under bridges
illustrates. 2 Securities violations are committed by people who buy
and sell stock, just as election law crimes are committed by those who
run for office or those who help them ge t ele cted. But when it comes
to temptations that apply to rich and poor alike, the law must treat
violators at least roughly the same, regardless of where they hail from
and how expensive the real estate is there .
Fifth , the law must not punish intent divorced from conduct. No
one can know the disposition of another's heart, so law that seeks to
punish that disposition would inevitably be un-law-like .
All these commitments apply in theory to civil and criminal justice
alike , but they apply with special force in c riminal cases. Legality is
supposed to be honored in all the government does, but th ere is
some room for play in the joints in civil regulatory systems . This is
not so in criminal cases. If there is one key condi tion that must be
satisfied fo r a country to call itself free, it is that no one can be
thrown in prison for no bette r reason than be cause it pleased some
government official to put him there. Legality requires that the law
put him th ere.
That is the way things are supposed to work. The reality of the
American legal system is different. Civil liability "rules" are often n o
more spe cific than the principle that regulated actors should behave
reasonably. What reasonableness means depends o n which jury or
which regulatory agency made the judgment and when. Criminal jus
tice is worse. Criminal codes cover a mountain of conduct, much
more than any prosecutor's office could hope to punish . Police and
prosecutors pick and ch oose , and they apply legal rules to one case
that they would never apply to an other. I n federal cases, when offi
c ials suspect someone of crimes that are regularly enforced, they of
ten targe t him for "crimes" that are virtually never punished. Federal
agen ts and prosecutors though t Martha Stewart was guilty of criminal
insider trading and misdisclosure . The misdisclosure charge was
dismissed, and insider trading was never ac tually charged, but Stewart
we n t to prison anyway for lying to federal agen ts and obstruc ting jus
tice-crimes that are committed every day without legal consequence.
Sometimes officials generate th e crimes in question-just as Kenneth
Starr's prosecutors and Paula Jones's lawyers created the "perjury
trap" that almost cost Presiden t Bill Clinton his job seven years ago .
People l ike Stewart go to prison for being famous and unpopular.
2 "The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under
bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread." JOHN BARTLETT, FA\1ILlAR QUOTATIONS 655
(Emily Morison Beck ed., 15th ed. 1980) (quoting Al\JATOLE FRA.NCE, LE Lvs ROUGE (1894)).
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People l ike Clinton go to prison (when they do) just fo r being fa
mous-a headline for the age nts and prosecutors who take them
3
down .
Lawlessness is not mere ly the lot of rich celebrities. Drug crimes
4
in poor city neighborh oods regularly lead to long prison te rms . Up
per-class drug crime is treated more generously.� Often it is simply
ignored since ferre ting it out costs more than police have to spend.
In short, the rule of law is h o nored in theory but widely ignored in
practice. Discretion mostly rules in America's justice syste m , espe
cially its criminal justice system-the place whe re legality is supposed
to be most sacred. Why?
We believe the answer comes in two steps . Step one has to do with
law ' s ambition. Judging from appellate opinions and law reviews,
American law is supposed to do a great deal more th an define con
duct rules and determine litigation outcomes. I t is supposed to in
spire , to express our deepest value s, to shape our iden tity. Above all ,
i t i s supposed to teach. The various bodies of law that regulate com
mercial dishonesty seem designed to define a moral code for business
and finance. Criminal codes likewise look like moral codes, and, like
moral codes, they are comprehensive: no petty wrong, n o act of self
ishness is too trivial to escape their notice. But misbehavior, selfish
ness, and dishonest business p ractices are too com mon; the legal sys
tem cannot deal with them all. So, law enfo rcers must be selective ,
an d th eir selections end up defining the real line between punished
and permitte d behavior. The rule of law becomes a veneer that hides
the rule of discre tion. Notice th e relationship : the more law seeks to
do, the farther it strays from the modest goal of resolving litigation
outcomes, the bigger the role discretion plays in the actual operation
of the legal system. The rule of law wo rks only if law does not seek to
rule too much.
The second step has to do with an unlike ly subject: Christian
th eology. Christianity too sees law as a beautiful thing that deligh ts
the soul and serves as a so urce of inspiration and wise teach ing on
how to l ive life well. But the law that does all these good th ings is not
meant for code books and courtrooms; it exists to govern th e hearts

3 For a more detailed discussion of pre textual prose cutions like Martha Stewart's and (if
impeachment counts as a prosecutio n ) Bill Clinton's, see Daniel C. Richman & William J.
Stuntz, Al Capone's Revenge: An Essay on the Political Economy of Pretextual Prosecution, 105 COLUM.
L. REv. 583 (2005) .
4 See Willia m J Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1 795 , 1832 (1998) [herein
after Stun tz, Race, Class, and Drugs] ( explaining how the criminal justice system targets drug
markets in poor city neighborhoods for a variety of often defensible reasons, but the dispropor
tionate presence in poor neighborhoods produces a perception of discriminatory treatmen t ) .
S See id. at 1821-22 (discussing the costs and burdens o f investigating upper-class drug
crim e ) .
.

:
. ...
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of the men and women God made in His image. Jesus' discussion of
adultery and murder in the Sermon on the Mount proves the point:

as He defines them, the prohibitions against these acts are ones that
6
no legal system, ancient or modern, could possibly enforce.
Christianity also contains the seeds of the rule of law:

the ideas

that all men and women have dignity in God's eyes, and that all need
7
governing because all are prone to sin. Yet, different rules exist for
Martha Stewart than for the rest of us; different rules exist for the
teenage boys who deal crack in city neighborhoods than for their

counterparts who sell cocaine powder in the suburbs; different rules

exist for cases that land on different prosecutors' desks. These things

are not consistent with the Christian conception of who we are: men
and women made in the Father's image, all of whom have strayed
8
from His ways like lost sheep. Christianity seems to require the rule

of law, yet its vision of law is one that cannot function without mas

sive, un-law-like discretion-discretion that violates all five of the tra
ditional rule-of-law principles. The solution to this seeming inconsis
tency is the rule of

two kinds

of law:

one for hearts and minds, and

the other for code books and courtrooms. Only God's law is fit for

the former purpose. Law that operates in the latter territories must

have more humble ambitions.

To put the point more simply, the bodies of law that govern

twenty-first-century America generally draw lines between good and

bad, proper and improper behavior. Such laws cannot possibly gov

ern; there is simply too much bad conduct. Good
for bad

legal codes.

moral

codes make

Laws that aspire to teach citizens how to live and

at the same time seek to govern the imposition of tangible legal pen

alties are likely only to teach lessons in arbitrary government and the

rule of discretion. Perhaps God intended that His law should be the

exclusive source of such moral teaching. If laws that govern men's

and women's affairs are to function as law, and not as a cover for offi
cial discretion, they need to pursue a more modest agenda.

Part I of this essay briefly explores the Christian conception of law.

The various restrictions that travel under the label of legality follow

naturally from Christian premises. But God's law violates all those re

strictions. And God's law is likewise seen in Christian scripture as a

source of inspiration, joy, and wisdom. It could not provide those

benefits if it remained within rule-of-Iaw boundaries. Law can teach
6

The most detailed account of the Sermon on the Mount is recorded in Matthew:5 (English

Standard). Christ's teachings about adultery and murder appear at Matthew 5:27-28 (ad ultery)
and Matthew 5:21-26 (murder). Unless othen-'Iise noted, all subse quent translations of the Bible
are from the English Standard Version, which is available at http://www.gnpcb.org/esv/.
7

8

See, e.g., Romans 3:23 (stating that "all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God").

See, e.g., [wiah 53:6 ("All we like sheep have gone astray . . . . ") ; I Peter 2:25 ("For YOLl were

straying like sheep . . . .") .
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us how to live or it can send us to prison when we live especially

badly. It cannot do both.

Part II takes up the laws that

do send

people to prison, along with

the civil laws that govern business relationships.

Here we explore

why, as law covers ever more territory, it must become ever less law

like. And twenty-first-century American law covers a very broad terri

tory indeed. We suggest that its broad scope follows naturally from its

high ambition. If our society is to recover the rule of law, it must be a
more modest law that rules.

I. THE RULE OF GOD'S LAW
There is no Equal Protection Clause in the Bible, no guarantee

that God will treat all His creatures the same.

Nor is there any ex

plicit command that earthly governments do so. C. S. Lewis, perhaps

the most broadly influential Christian thinker of the twentieth cen
tury, argued that equality is no part of God's world, that Heaven is a

place of radical inequality. ""Vhy else were individuals created," Lewis

asked, "but that God, loving all infinitely, should love each differ
,9
ently?,
Even so, there are important family resemblances between

the teachings of Christian scripture, on the one hand, and equal pro
tection and other rule-of-Iaw principles on the other.

These resem

blances follow directly from two of the Bible's central themes.

First, the Bible teaches that each of us is made in God's image.

"And God created the human in his image," we read in the account
o
of creation in the Bible's very first chapter.1 " [I]n the image of God
!
He created him, male and female He created them."! This theme

runs through all of the Christian scriptures, Old and New Testaments
alike.

VVhen the Jews were tempted to worship the idols of the na

tions that surrounded them, the prophets reminded them that,

whereas idols are fashioned by the hands of men, they had been
2
made by and in the image of God.1 The Apostle Paul declares that
"we are [God's] workmanship, created in ChristJesus for good works,

which God prepared beforehand, that we should walk in them.,, !3
VVhenJesus was asked whether it was proper for observantJews to pay
taxes to Caesar, he noted that Caesar's image was on the questioner'S

coins and then said: "[t] herefore render to Caesar the things that are

9

to

c.s. LEYvlS, THE PROBLEM OF PAIN

Moses.

12

13

(MacMillan

ROBERT ALTER, THE FIVE BOOKS OF MOSES:

(2005) (ci ling
II

150

1962) (1940).

This quotation is taken from Robert Alter's splendid new translation of the five books of

Id.

Genesis

Isaiah 46:1-4.
r_1Jhesians 2: 10.

1:27).

A TRAl'.iSLATION WITH COMMENTARY
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,,
Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's. !'1 This is a clear ref

erence to the image of God stamped on us all.

The second theme is as disheartening as the first is uplifting. The

Bible tells us that each one of us has sinned-even more, that the de

sire to sin is woven into our very being. "[T] here is none who does
good, not even one," David says in the Psalms.15

turned aside ....,,!6

"They have all

Picking up on this theme, the New Testament
,,
pronounces that "all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God. !7
None of us is perfect or anywhere close to it. More than that, we are

all radically imperfect-prone to selfishness and exploitation, ready to

seize opportunities for our own advancement even if doing so brings
injury and injustice to others. Sin is not just what we do (though we
do a lot of it); it is who we are.

The first of these themes suggests that everyone deserves to be

treated with dignity. Caesar's image stood for Rome's power; the face

on a coin in the ancient world was a sign of the respect that power

commanded.IS God's image in each of us likewise commands respect.

And since the image is shared by rich and poor alike, so too is the

dignity that the image conveys. That is one respect in which the Bible

definitely is egalitarian.

Again and again, we are told to care for the

poor widows, and strangers-those who lack the means to care for
,
themselves or the networks to get others to care for them. The

Psalms pray for a king who "delivers the needy when he calls, the
,
poor and him who has no helper.,19 AndJesus told his followers that
whatever they do to care for "the least of these [his] brothers," they

do for him: a clear statement that he identifies with those at the bot
tom of the ladder, not those at the top.02

An obvious implication of the second theme-that all of us are

sinners-is that we need to be governed, restrained from acting on

our worst impulses. If we were simply left to our own devices, our sin

would produce chaos. It is important to underscore, moreover, that
since all of us sin, the need for government is universal; no one is ex

empt from this need for oversight. Those who govern-the lawmak
ers who make the laws and the police, prosecutors, regulators, and
judges who enforce them-do not stand outside ana apart from sin;

14
15

iii
17
1

M

Nlalthew 22:21.
Psalm 14:3.
fel.
Romans 3:23.
I t i s f o r this reason that the early Christian pronouncement that 'jesus is Lord" was a radi

cal political statement, a challenge to Caesar's claim of ultimate authority . This theme is ex
plored in detail in OUVER O'DONOVAN, THE DESIRE OF THE NAnO�S:
ROOTS OF POUTICAL THEOLOGY
19
�(J

Psalm 72:12.
J\I[auheuJ 25:40.

(1996).
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they too are in its grasp. It follows that the governors need to be gov
erned, just like the rest of us.

Weave these two threads together and one sees a familiar fabric.

Government is essential to avoid lives that are, in Hobbes' famous
,
phrase, "nasty, brutish, and short., 21
But that government should

treat even those it punishes with the dignity and respect due to crea

tures made in God's image.

If anything, that requirement is height

ened when the government's wrath is visited on the poor, who are
usually the recipients of criminal punishment.

And, since sin is uni

versal and since those who govern must themselves be governed, law
(not government officials) must do the restraining.

Rulers must sub

mit to the same rules they apply to others. There is one more reason

why law rather than discretion must be the driving force behind offi
cial punishment.

If discretion governs, those who punish must have

clean hands; they must stand in a superior moral position relative to
those they condemn.

But the Bible teaches that no one has clean

hands; none of us can fairly claim moral superiority.22 So no one can
pass judgment. Only the law itself can do so.

These Biblical principles lead, in other words, to the same rule-of

law principles that our legal system purports to honor. Clearly articu

lated rules,23 not jurors' or judges' whims, should be the basis for de

cisions that impose criminal or civil liability on the state's citizens.

This principle follows from the proposition that those whims are in
part the product of sin:

discretionary power means the power to op

press, something all power-holders are tempted to do.

rules must have a reasonable measure of specificity.

So, too, the

While no legal

system can define permissible and impermissible behavior in intricate
detail, the line between the

DNO

should be reasonably clear.

Other

wise, we are right back in the world of unbounded discretion, with

prosecutors and regulators holding all the cards.

For the same rea

son, the rules should be specified in advance; if not, officials will be

tempted to apply different and harsher rules to those they target than

to the rest of the population.

Likewise, the same rules must apply to

rich and poor alike, if. all are to be treated with the dignity and re
spect that is due to creatures made in God's image.

And since that

image does not vary with skin color or neighborhood, the same rules
should apply to all races, ethnicities, and social classes.

Finally, be

cause none of us is in a position to judge another's thoughts or incli-

tl

THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 96 (A.P. Maninich ed., Broadview Literary Texts 2002)

(1651) .
""
See Psalm 14:3 ("They have all turned aside; wgether they have become corrup t; there is
none who does good, not even one.");

Romans 3:23

("[FJor all have sinned and fall shan of the

glory of God .... ")
""
Note once a gain t.hat we are using t he term "rule" broadly her e w encompass any legal
.

regula tion.

1I

I

I

I
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nations-only the Lord, as God told Samuel, can look on a person's
heare 4-the law should punish conduct , and never intent alone.
The rule of law thus follows quite naturally from Christian p re m
ises. But how can this be reconciled with God ' s law i tself? Consider
how Go d ' s law is portraye d in the New Testament. The most familiar
summary of God ' s law is the Golden Rule: Christ's command that we
l ove God with all of our heart , soul, and mind, and that we love our
neighbors as we love ourselves. 25 Whatever else one can say about this
twin command, it does not confo rm to the principle that rules must
be defined with reasonable specificity. On the contrary, one can
barely imagine a more vague and open-ended legal requirement.
Perhaps the vagueness is nothing more than the inevitable conse
quence of the fact that Jesus is summarizing God ' s law, rather than
spelling it out in detail . But Christ's more detaile d p ronouncements
are likewise at odds with traditional rule-of-Iaw principles. In the
Sermon on the Mount, Jesus defines as murderers "eve gone wh o is
,
angry with his brother," even those who say, '''You fool! , , 2 Adulterers
include not only those who have sexual relations with o thers' spouses ,
7
b u t "everyone who looks a t a woman with lustful intent. ,, 2 Plainly,
these broad definitions violate the principle that punishment should
be based on conduct, not inte n t alone.
Their breadth also violates the principle that rules, n o t discretion ,
should determine who pays legal penalties. No legal system that de
fined murde r and adultery as Jesus did could enforce those offenses
with any consistency. Such laws would function like highway speed
limits-all drivers violate them, so the real law is whatever state troop
ers decide . And Jesus himself applied God's law differently to differ
ent people, violating the principle that all should b e bound by the
same rules. Recall the rich young ruler wh o asks Jesus what he must
2
do to obtain eternal life. 8 Jesus first tells the wealthy man that he
, 9
must "keep the commandments" if he wants to "have ete rnal l ife . , 2
When
to sell
whe re
on his

the man says " [a] II these I h ave kept , " Jesus instructs the man
D
everything he owns, give it to the poor, and follow him. 3 No
else in the New Testament does Jesus impose this obligation
followers generally, or indeed on anyone else.

2 4 See 1 Samuel 16:7 (" [M]an looks on the outward appearance, but the LORD looks on the
heart.").
2 5 See e. g. , Matthew 7:12 ("So whatever you wish that others would do to you, do also to them,
,
for this is the Law and the Prophets.").
2 6 Matthew 5:22.
27 Matthew 5:28.
�8 See Matthew 19: 16.
29 Matthew 19:16-17.
30

Matthew 19:20-21.
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God's law, as Jesus teaches and applies it, violates every single
principle that flies under the banner of the "rule of law." If the state
tried to replicate this law in a legal code, police and p rosecutors
would have to tal, absolu te discretion to choose who should be sent to
prison and who shoul d go fre e ; and civil law regulators could pick
their leas t favorite CEO and punish him or her whenever they chose.
In practice, the discretionary choices of the gove rno rs , rath er than
God ' s law itself, would govern the people . Yet the same Bible that
seems to flou t rule-of-Iaw norms also seems to require th ose norms.
How is the circle to be squared?
The answer is that two different kinds of law are at issue. Rule-of
law norms derive from the practical realities of controlling wrongdo
ing in a world filled with wrongdoing-a world in which all sin bu t
only some sinners can be punished, wh ere rulers are prone to favorit
ism and exploitation while those they rule need wise laws to protect
them from one another. In such a world, law must play a double
game: restrain ing the worst wrongs by the citizenry wi thout empow
ering judges and prosecutors to do wrong themselves. Th e key to
playing that double game well is to limit law's reach . Only th e most
destructive and most readily verifiable wro ngs should be fo rbidden ,
because fo rbidding more would turn punishment over to the discre
tion of law enforcers.
God's law is not bound by th ose limits, because it plays no double
game. The Lawmake r need not restrain H imself. He is not the p rob
lem. We are . His law can the refore be comprehensive , cove ring all
wrongs, not j ust those that a given society can afford to punish. H is
law is not limited to conduct, be cause th e God in wh ose image we are
made sees the thoughts that lie behind conduct. Nothing is hidden
from Him. His law covers everything, all of life-it is not law defined
by its limits, but law without lim its.
That limitless, comprehensive quality is closely tied to another fea
ture that receives a great deal of commen t in scripture : law's deligh t
fulness. The beauty of God' s law, and the sheer j oy it imparts, is a
frequent theme of the Psalms. "The law of the LORD is perfect,"
David marve ls, "reviving th e soul . . . the rules of the LORD are tru e ,
an d righ te ous altogether. More to be desired are they than gold,
even much fine gold; swee ter also than honey and drippings of the
honeycomb.,,31 Another psalmist proclaims , with evident relish, that
" I will meditate on your precepts and fix my eyes on your ways . I will
,, 2
delight in your statutes; I will not forge t your word . 3 "Your testimo
nies are wo nderful ," he goes on to say, " th erefore my soul keeps
them. The unfolding of your words gives light; it imparts understand3l
32

Psalm 19:7,9-10.
Psalm 119;15-16.

818

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LA W

[Vol. 8:4

ing to the simple. I open my mouth and pant, because I long for
,,3f
your cornman dmen ts .
This language sounds strange to twenty-first-century American
ears: delight and longing are hardly the first things that come to
n1ind for n10st of us when we think about law. But the responses are
not as strange as they first seem. Most of us have had, at one time o r
another, great teachers who inspired and delighted their classes . The
best teachers and the best teaching do that. It should come as no
surprise that God ' s wisdom-better teaching than one finds in the
best-run classroom-prompts the same reac tion. And wisdom is pre
c isely what a comprehensive moral law p rovides. C . S . Lewis put it
well, though incomplete ly, when he called God ' s law "the 'real ' or
,,34
'correct' or stable, well-grounded, directions for living.
"Directions
fo r living" sounds prosaic, but th e portions of scripture that provide
those directions most explicitly are anything but. The Ten Com
mandmen ts and the Sermon on the Mount are , among other things ,
great literature , more poe try th an prose. That, too , should come as
no surprise . A well-lived life is a beautiful thing to behold, a source of
delight and inspiration to those fortunate enough to see it. The
principles that define such a life are likewise beau tiful to behold, and
they are natural subje cts fo r great literature .
Legal codes are not natural subjects for great lite rature , which is
why Exodus 2 2 : 1- 1 5 , the passage that defines punishm ents for various
offe nses against prope rty rights, reads so diffe rently than Exodus 20: 11 7 , th e passage that defines both God 's relationship with us ( the first
four commandme nts) and our relationships with one another ( the
last six) . Exodus 22 reads like what it is: a legal code , designed to
specify conduct rules and punishments to be imposed by human be
ings on other human beings . Exodus 20 reads like what it is : a code
for the life of the soul, not merely the life of buying and selling.
Notice that the very features that make Go d's law delightful-its
depth and comprehensive ness, the way it addre sses both the worst
wrongs and the deepest longings of our hearts and minds-also make
it impossible to use as a code to be enforced by, and against, sinful
men and women. The principle of legality exists to constrain the
power of human beings: police officers, prosecutors, and ju dges .
God ' s law has no human law enforcers, so it needs no such con
straint.
This sounds like dual ism. God ' s law, we seem to be suggesting, is
made for another world, whereas our legal codes operate in this
world. The truth is otherwise . God 's law is likewise made for th is
world, for His wo rld; othe rwise it would not be so concerned with
33
34

Psalm 119: 129-3l.
C.S. LEWIS, REFLECTIONS ON THE PSALMS 60 (1958).
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teaching us how to live . But the Ten Commandments and the Ser
mon on the Mount are n o t made for the world of prosecutors' offices
and prisons, courtrooms and jury boxes . No comprehensive moral
code , no system of law that judges th ough ts as well as deeds , no law
that forbids not just adultery but lust and not just murder but unjusti
fie d anger, can se rve as a code for judges and ju ries .
I I . THE RULE

OF

MAN'S LAw

Judged by the shee r volume of legal doctrine , twen ty-first-century
America is among the most law-bound societies in human h istory.
Judged by common legal practice , it is not a society th at regularly
honors prin ciples of legality-notwithstanding our purporte d com
mitment to those principles. The second statement follows naturally
from the first: the law of code books and case repo rters cannot rule
when it covers too much terri tory. And our law covers a great deal of
territo ry.
Consider first the civil justice system . I ndividuals must behave rea
sonably, mean ing they must obey the Golden Rule ( i . e . , take account
of the costs of their ac tivity to o thers as they take accoun t of costs to
themselves) or risk tort liabil ity wh en they cause harm . Of course ,
th e negligence standard has been around fo r a very long time . But it
has not always taken its present form . The common law bounded
negligence liability with defenses like contributory negligence and as
sump tion of risk, with narrow causation doctrin es and with limited
duties of care . The few plaintiffs who could overcome those obstacles
faced s trict limits on remedies: damages fo r physical injury but not
fo r physical or emotional pai n , damages for property damage but not
fo r economic loss. The Golden Rule was not enforced across the
board; liability was much more limited than that. Today, liability is a
great deal broader and, no t coincide n tally, its boun daries are a great
deal less certain and less law-like .
That is just tort law. Similar stories can be told about o ther com
mo n-law liability regimes. And a host of statutory systems establish
civil liability in areas that were unknown at common law. Many of
those liability regimes are good and useful . Rules that limit or forbid
pollution and securities fraud , dangerous workplaces and discrimina
tory h iring practices are all signs of legal progress. But progress has
come at th e price of broad, negligence-like l iability regimes that
mean whateve r juries or gove rnment regulators decide they mean.
Civil l iability regimes often seem in tension with rule-of-Iaw norms,
but th e degree of the tension is limite d by the nature of the liability.
If all manufacturers of dangerous products are liable fo r damages
(generously defined) to those who suffer injuries attributable to those
p roducts, a large frac tion of serious injuries will prompt lawsuits, be
cause olaintiffs and their lawyers stand to make money from those

1!
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lawsuits. The law wil l be litigated to the margin, or nearly SO. 35 If li
ability is grossly exc essive , courts will see th e consequences of the ex
cess and (one hopes) take steps to remedy the p roblem. At l east to
some degree, the system is self-correcting.
That is not true of criminal liability rules. The state has a practical
monopo ly on enforcing such rules and no one vvins a bounty when
the rules are successfully enforced. Because no one h as an incentive
to enforce those rules across the board, there is no self-co rrecting
mechanism. I ndeed, legal excess is actually self-reinforcing. If Con
gress passes an overbroad c riminal statute , one of two things is like ly
to happen. Fede ral agen ts and p rosecutors may use the statute o n ly
occasionally, as a means of inducing guilty pleas from defe ndan ts
suspected of other crimes. That use is largely invisible: its effect is to
make criminal convictions cheap e r, which is something both Con
gress and prosecutors want. The other possibility is that a few prose
cutors will use the statute against defendants who do not deserve to
be punished, much like the independent counsels of th e 1 990s tried
to e nforce overbroad fe de ral crimes against the politicians caugh t in
their crossh airs . 36 Those investigations ruined the reputations of the
prose cutors who pressed th em. But they did not lead to demands
that Congress narrow the relevan t federal statutes. 37 The contrast is
telling.
The result is that criminal law proliferates. Legislatures regularly
add crimes and rarely remove them. Criminal codes become ever
broader and ever more cluttered with obscure, outmoded p roh ibi
tions just waiting for some entrepreneurial prose cutor to use them to
extrac t a more favorable plea bargain. 38 The fraction of the popula
tion th at is guilty of one or ano th er jailable offense grows eve r lar
ger. 39 The disc retionary power of police office rs and prosecutors
grows with it.

:15

This i s the intuition behind the longstanding debate over the efficiency (or not) o f the

common law. For a good recent survey of the debate, see Paul

H.

Rubin, MicTO and lV1acro Legal

Efficiency: SujJPly and Demand, 13 SUP. CT. ECON. REv. 19 ( 2005 ) .
36

See Richman & Stuntz, supra note 3, a t 590-94 (describing the various ways in which inde

pendent counsels used broadly defined crimes to pursue either innocent or only marginally
guilty politicians).
37

See William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law's Disappearing Shadow, 1 1 7 HARv. L.
REv. 2548,2557 (2004) [hereinafter Stuntz, Plea Bargaining] (explaining that the public blamed
Congress only for its prosecutorial role in Clinton's impeachment, not for its original passage of
the law giving rise to the impeachment).

The discussion that follows in the text draws in the

reasoning in this Article.
38

See id. at 2558 (describing the legislature's tendency to gradually add new criminal prohi

bitions without deleting any of the old ones).
39

Notice that the share of the population that is guilty of violating the criminal code is in

dependent of the inmate population.

The former depends on the scope of criminal codes.

The latter depends primarily on prosecutors' char ging decisions.

Aug. 2006]

CHRJSTIANITY AND THE (MODEST) RULE OF LA W

821

Broad as it is, that discre tionary power is substan tially constrained
when the police officers and prosecutors work for city or county gov
ernmen ts . Those governments operate under severe budget con
straints; the last thirty years have seen massive docket increases with
only modest increases in personnel.40 The consequence is that, at
least in high-crime jurisdic tions, prosecutors lack the time to go after
the kinds of offenses the pursuit of which made Ken Starr infamous. 41
The many rococo crimes that litter state codes do n o t matter much;
prosecutors fo cus instead on core violent crimes, maj or thefts, and
drug deals. 42 Drug crime aside, the rule of law functions better than
one would suspect fro m a glance at th e code books.
In federal court, by contrast, the rule of law barely functions at al l.
Federal prosecutors are much be tter fun ded than are th eir local
counterparts.43 And they have a much smaller range of responsibili
ties-if murderers or rapists go unpunished, th e local district attor
ney may lose h is j ob, while United States attorneys are free to go afte r
the cases they think matter most or the cases most likely to yield
headlines. The federal code gives them an enormous array of charg
ing options. There are hundreds ( literally) of fraud and m isrepre
sentation statutes, covering a large fraction of the lies and almost-but
not-quite lies anyone migh t tell . 44 Very little dishonesty is ac tually
punished. During Clin ton ' s impeachm ent hearings, people scoured
the case reporters looking for examples of sex-related lies during
depositions that led to criminal charges. The lies themselves are
surely common (consider how many civil cases involve allegations of
sexual misconduct) , but only a handful of cases were found, with
none being factually similar to Clinto n ' s case .45 Yet, if federal fraud

40

Srun tz, Plea BaTgaining, supra note 37, at 2555-56 & nn.9-13, and sources cited therein.
See Richman & Stuntz, supra note 3, at 600-08, (discussing the reasons behind prosecu
tors' inability to pursue these cases) .
42 See id. at 600.
43 See generally Richman & Stun tz, supra note 3, at 607 (noting the severe budgetary con
straints facing local officials as compared with federal officials).
44 As of 1998, one scholar cou n ted a total of 325 fraud and m isrepresen tation statutes.
See
Jeffrey Standen, An Economic /fjrspective on Federal Criminal Law Reform, 2 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 249,
289 (1998).
45 During the House impeachment hearings, Alan Dershowitz testified that "the false state
ments of which President Clinton is accused fall at the most marginal end of the least culpable
genre of this continuum of offenses and would never even be considered for prosecution in the
routine case involving an ordinary defendant."
The Consequences of Perjury and Related
Crimes: Hearing BefOTe the H. Comm. on the Judicimy, 105th Congo 87 (1998) (statement of
Alan M. Dershowitz, Fel ix Frankfu rter Professor of Law, H arvard Law School), available
at http://frwebgateo . access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin /ge tdoc.cgi?dbname= 1 05_house_hearings&docid=
f:53247.waiso In the same hearing, Jeffrey Rosen testified that "neither the indepen dent counsel
nor anyone else, to my knowledge, has been able to iden tify a case where a defendant was
prosecuted, let alone convicted, for peripheral statem ents in a civil proceeding that he or she
did not initiate in order to derive some kind of benefit." The Consequences of Pe'ljU7y and Related
41
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statutes occasion few prosecutions, collectively those statutes h ave
large effects. They function as a kind of menu-a list of charging op
tions a prosecutor may pursue once she decides to focus her atten
tion on a particular suspect.
Often the targe ting comes first, and the charges are an after
though t. Starr 's investigation began as an effo rt to u ncove r crimes
related to the loo ting of an Arkansas savings and loan . But Monica
Lewinsky fell into Starr ' s lap (so to speak) , and the rest is history.46
So , too , federal age nts set out to nail Martha Stewart for insider trad
ing, but when that didn ' t work, got her for lyinf during th e course of
4
th e investigation .47 In Brogan v. United States, agen ts suspected the
defendant of labor racke teering but were uncertain that they could
gain a conviction for that crime. So th e age nts showed up at Bro
gan ' s home , asked him whether he had taken money from the re le
vant companies ( the agen ts knew that the answer was yes and th at
taking the money was not necessarily a crime ) , and wh en a startled
Brogan said no, the agen ts told h im-correctly-that he had just vio
late d the federal false-statements statute .'19 Brogan ' s conviction under
that statute was not primarily a consequence of the law; agents ' and
prosecutors ' discretion mattered much more . I n that respect, Brogan
is typical of federal criminal prosecutions.
The requirement that law be primary, and discretion secondary, is
not the only rule-of-Iaw prin ciple that the federal cri minal j ustice sys
tem regularly violates. Many federal crimes, including ones that are
frequently prose cuted, are defined i n the vaguest possible te rms . No
one knows what a "scheme or artifice to deprive anoth e r of the intan
gible right of honest services" is ,50 but thousands of people sit in fed
eral prison convicted of intangible-rights mail fraud. Brogan's crime ,
like Clinton ' s and Martha Stewart' s , was n o t truly a crime before Bro
gan committed it; the decision to targe t Brogan came first, after
which agents maneuvered him into saying the wrong thing, in effect
talking himself into a prison sentence .'" Furthermore , n o one famil-

Crimes: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on theJudicia1Y, supra, at 97 (statement ofJeffrey Rosen, Asso
ciate Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School) .
•6
For a good (and scathing) account of the story, see Robert W. Gordon, Imprudence and
Partisanship: Starr's Ole and the Clinton-Lewinsky Affair, 68 FORDHAM L. REv. 639, 672-73 (1999 ) .
47 O n the charges against Stewart, see Constance L Hays, N/artha Stewart Indicted by U.S. on
Obstruction, NY. TIMES , June 5 , 2003; at A I . For a defense of thegovernment's tactics, see Scott
Turow, Op-Ed., Cry No Tears for Martha Stewart, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 2004, at A29.
4 8 522 U.S. 398 ( 1998) .
49 See id. at 409-10 (Ginsburg, ] . , concurring) .
50 See 18 U.s.c. § 1346 ( 2000 ) (defining "scheme or artifice to defraud" as including the
quoted phrase) .
51 In her concurring opinion in Brogan Jus tice Ginsburg explained the danger of this type of
maneuvering: "if an investigator finds it difficult to prove some elements of a crime, she can ask
questions about other elements to which she already knows the answers. If the suspect lies, she
,
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iar with federal drug laws would say that the law means the same
thing in different n eighborhoods. Crack cocaine is often sold in out
door stree t marke ts in poor inner-city neighborhoods. Cocaine pow
der is sold more discreetly, usually in wealthier communities. 5 2 Se ll
ing crack is vastly more like ly to lead to a prison sentence than selling
cocaine powder because the c rack markets are more easily ide n tified
by the police . And federal sentencing rules ensure that crack dealers
pay a much bigger price for their crimes than dealers i n cocaine
powder.53 Although poor whites are much more numerous , their
population is more dispe rsed; Mrican Americans are a large frac tion
of the urban poor. The upshot is th at many young black men are
treated very differently and much more harshly than young white
men who commit similar crim es.
Finally, a number of fede ral criminal statutes seem to attach
criminal liability to intent divorced from conduc t. The most famous
exam ple of th is phenomenon is the Travel Ac t, which makes it a fed
eral felony to cross a state line with the intent to commit any of a long
list of crimes, including some trivial ones like gambling.54 The only
conduc t element i n Travel Ac t prose cutions is crossing a state line
hardly a sign of a deep moral failing. It should come as no surprise
that the Trave l Act is largely strategic : it was proposed by th en Attor
ney Ge neral Robert Ken nedy in order to give fe deral p rosecutors a
more effective means of nailing Mafia defendants .55 Today, the fed
eral government uses the same tactics against suspected terrorists , as
the n-Atto rney Gen e ral John Ashcroft proudly stated:
Attorney Gen e ral [Robert] Ken nedy made no apologies for using all
of the available resources i n the law to disrupt a n d disman tle organized
crime n e tworks.

Very ofte n , prosecutors were aggressive , using obscure

statutes to arrest and de tai n suspected mobsters.

One rac keteer and h is

father were i n di c ted fo r lyin g o n a fed e ral home loan application .

A

fo rmer gunman fo r the Capone mob was brough t to court on a violati on
of the Migratory Bird Act. Agents fo und 563 game birds in his freezer-a
mere 539 b irds over the limit.

can then use the crime
substitute for the crime
Comment,

� has prompted as leverage or
St e cannot prove ." Brogan, 5 2 2

can seek prosecution for the lie as a
U.S. at 4 1 1 (quoting Giles

False Statements to Federal Agents: Induced Lies and the Exculpatory No,

57

U.

A.

CHI.

Birch,

L.

REv.

1 2 73 , 1 2 78 ( 1 990» .
52

See Stuntz, Race, Class, and D rugs, supra note

4, at 1 808-09 & n n . 2 4-29 ( 1 99 8 ) , and sources

cited therein (describing the differences between markets for crack and cocaine powder) .
53

For the classic (and still the best) discussion of how those rules came to be, see David A.

Cocaine, Race, and Equal Protection, 47 STAN . L. REv. 1 2 83, 1 2 85-97 ( 1 995 ) .
§ 1 9 5 2 (2000 ) .
55 See NANCY E. MARION, A H I STORY OF FEDERAL CRIME CONTROL IN ITIATfVES, 1 9 60- 1 993, at
28-30 (Steven A. Egger ed., 1994) (stati ng that Kennedy proposed eight new laws to fight or

Sklansky,
54

1 8 U.S.c.

ganized crime)

.
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Robert Ken n e dy's Justice D epartme n t, i t is sai d , would arrest mob
sters fo r "spittin g on the s idewalk" if i t would h e l p in the battle again s t
o rganized crime . I t h as b e e n a n d w i l l be the policy o f this D epartm e n t of
Justice to use t h e same aggressive arrest and detention tactics in the war
o n terro r .

56

Why does fede ral criminal law so thoroughly violate rule-of-Iaw
p rinciples?
One reason is institutional.
Congress criminalizes
broadly be cause doing so is cheap; members know that th e laws they
p ass will rarely be enforced (and when they are enforced, they will of
ten be used against people suspected of o ther, more serious crimes
l ike the terrorists and mobsters i n Ashcroft ' s examples ) . New crimi
n al p rohibitions are inexpensive ways of taking a s tand against one or
another type of crime . The fe deral Violence Against Wom e n Ac t
( "VAWA" ) , passed in 1 994,5 7 produced zero prose cutions in 1 997.58
I n a system l ike th at, proliferation of new crimes is natural. The same
is true of harsh sentencing laws . Tens of thousands of men and
women sit in fe deral prison on drug charges; the drug laws are not as
cheap as VAWA. But those laws are not exac tly expensive eith e r : the
total federal prison population is about 1 70,000, compared to l . 9 mil
lion inmates incarcerated on state-law charges.59 Predictably, state
legislatures p ay some atten tion to the consequences of harsh sentenc
ing rules, since those rules cost a great deal of money.60 Congress has
much more money to spend and i ts sentencing rules cost less . There
is little incentive to worry about whether sentencing rules are too
harsh .
I nstitutional incentives go some distance toward explaining the
gap between rule-of-law norms and fe deral criminal practice , but not
the whole distance. Another explan ation has more to do with ideol
ogy than institutions. Federal criminal law h as a long history of mor
alism, dating to the days of the Mann Act6! and Prohibition. The
small size of the federal enforcemen t bureaucracy ( the FBI has fewer
than 1 2 ,000 agen ts, compared to 700,000 state and local police offi-

56

(Oct.

Attorney General john Ashcroft, Prepared Remarks for the
25,

200 1 )

U.S.

Mayors' Conference

(transcript available at http : / / www. usdoj. gov/archive/ag/sp e e c h es/ 200 1 /

agcrisisremarks 1 0_25.htm) .
57

Pub. L. No. 1 0 3-3 2 2 , 1 08 Stat . 1 90 2 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42

U .s.c. ) .
58

SeeJAMES A. STRAZZELL.A, AM. BAR ASS'N, THE FEDERALIZATION O F CRIMINAL LAw 2 0 ( 1 998)

(stating that there were no federal prosecutions for "interstate dom estic violence" i n 1 997) .
59

B U REAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTI CE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE

STATISTICS 2003, at 479 tbI .6.2, available at http :// www. albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t62.pdf.
GO

For an excellent discussion of t h e de cision-making dynamics in states with sentencing

guidelines, see Rachel
6\

E.

Barkow, Administering Crime, 52

U CLA L.

REV. 7 1 5 ( 2005 ) .

The Mann Act made it a crime to knowin gly transport any individual fOl- the purpose of

prostitution or any sexual activity which is f o rbidden by federal, state , or local law. See 18

§§

2 42 1 -23 (2000) .

U.s.c.

1

1
i
I

1
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cers ) 62 makes the federal criminal code an attractive vehicle for taking
symbolic moral stands. Me mbers of Congress can p lease constituents
who wish to condemn the relevant co nduct, without paying either th e
fiscal or poli tical price of stopp ing that conduct. I n contrast to le gisla
tio n that embodies compromises and tradeoffs, federal criminal law is
a land of broad "thou shalt nots , " leavin g th e compromises and
tradeoffs for law enforc ers . That is why vice has long played such a
key role in the field: th e Mann Act's emphasis on sexual immorality,
Prohibition , a succession of bans on other narcotics, the Travel Ac t,
and other federal gambling prohibitions. 5 3 "Whatever moral debate
curren tly occupies national atten tion, such as partial birth abortion
or human cloning, gene rally ends up adding a crime to Title 1 8 .
(Perhaps conspiracy to commit gay marriage will soon be a federal
felony. ) Although the fede ral government played a large role in en
fo rcing Prohibitio n , for the rest of the crimes mentioned in this p ara
graph , federal cases have been a small share-ten percent or less-of
total prosecutions.64 The laws in question are me ans of sen ding mes
sages to vo ters , not sending offenders to prison.
Something similar happens in the sphere of white-collar crime.
Consider th e large body of criminal law governing co rporate and
commercial misconduct. That law looks l ike a comprehensive code
of busin ess morality. Each new corporate scandal creates both insti
tutional incentives to ac t and the urge to send a moral message . The
first major securities laws, and the civil and criminal antifraud provi
sions that came with the m , were inspired by the scandals of the 1 9 30s.
Stock "pumping," "corners," and insider trading were all though t to
have been rife on Wall Stree t, so Congress outlawed manipulation ,
"schemes or artifices to defraud, " and the like . 65
In th e early 1 9 70s, during the Watergate investigations, the special
prosecutor discove red that many of America's best-known corpora
tions kep t slush funds to bribe foreign officials and for other sorts of
influence-peddling.
"The public , " observe Bill Bratton and Joe
McCahery, "already disgusted with corruption in government and
agitated by the media, now demanded a clean up of corruption in

62

See BU REAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 59, at 42 tbl . l .27 ( providing numbers of
state and local police officers), available at http://www. albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t127. pdf;
id. at 69 tbl . l .72 (providing num bers of federal agents), available at h ttp://www.albany.edu/
sourcebook/pdf/t172. pdf.
63 The history of gambling regulation is chronicled in exhaustive detail in NAT'L INST. OF
LAw ENFORCEMENT AND CRI MTNAL jUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE
LAw OF GAMBLING: 1776- 1976 ( 1977) .
6"

63

See, e.g. , Stuntz, Plea Bargaining, supra note 37, at 2565-66.

The relationship between scandal and corporate reform initiatives is discussed at length in
DAVID A. SKEEL, jR., IC.,\RUS I THE BOARDROO I: Tl IE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS I • CORPORATE
AMERlCA AND WHERE THEY CAI\II E FROM ( 200 5 ) .
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,
corporate America. , 66 Congress responded by enacting th e Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act, which included sweeping n ew provisions out
lawin g payments by a firm or any of i ts representatives to foreign offi.
1
CIa Is . 6
I n response t o the insti tutional pressure to ste p in once again af
ter the recent Enron and WorldCom scandals, Congress further
augm ented the long list of corporate crimes by enacting the Sar
banes-Oxley Act.68 In addition to sharply increasing the punishme n ts
under numerous existing provisions, the legislation added a slew of
new penalties for "any person who attempts or conspires to commit"
a securities offense ( punishable to the same exte n t as the offense in
question) ;69 for tampering with a record ( up to twe nty years in
prison) ;70 for destroying, altering, or falsifying records and documents
to impede or obstruct any fe deral investigation ( twen ty years ) ; 7 l and
fo r retaliating against informants ( ten years) .72 In effect, these provi
sions announce that any future corporate executive who does any of
th e bad things Enron 's executives did will have violated th e criminal
code . Congress completed the sweep by adding a broad new catch-all
p rovision that makes it a crime ( punishable by up to twen ty-five years
in prison) to "knowingly execute [ ] , or attempt [ J to execute , a
scheme or artifice . . . to defraud any person in connection with any
.
7
secunty. ,, 3
Many of the other provisions in the corporate responsibility le gis
lation are civil in fonn , including provisions requiring the company's
executives to certify its financial statements 74 and to establish an in
ternal compliance p rogram . 7 5 But these, too , expand the scope of po
ten tial criminal liability, due to the fact that se ction 2 1 of the 1 9 34
Securities Act defines every knowin g and willful violation of the secu
rities laws as a crime. 76 As a result, every time Congress adds a new
civil liability provision, it automatically adds another crime to th e fe d-

66

William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The Content of Corporate Federalism,
UCLA Law & Econ. Workshop 45 ( discussion draft Aug. 30, 2004) , available at h ttp:/ /
repositories. cdlib.org/ cgi/viewcon tent.cgi?article= 1 09 1 &con text=berkeley_law_econ.
67 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1 977, Pub. L . No. 95-2 1 3, sec. 1 02 , § 1 3 ( b ) , sec . J 03,
§ § 30A, 32, 9 1 Stat. 1 494 ( 1 977) ( codified as amended at 15 U.s.c. § § 78m (b) , 78dd-l to -2, 78ff
( 2000 » .
68 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 1 0 7-204, 1 1 6 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 1 1 , 1 5, 1 8 , 28, and 29 U.s.c. (Supp. II 2002» .
69 Sec. 902, § 1 349 ( codified as amended at 1 8 U.s.c. § 1 349 ( Supp. 11 2002» .
70 Sec. 1 1 02, § 1 5 1 2 (codified as amended at 1 8 U.s.c. § 1 5 1 2 (S upp. II 2002» .
71 Sec. 802, § 1 5 1 9 ( codified as amended at 1 8 U.s.C. § 1 5 1 9 ( Supp. II 2002» .
�
72 Sec. 1 1 07, § 1 5 1 3 (codified as am nded at 1 8 U.S.C. § 1 5 1 3 (Supp. II 2002» .
73 Sec. 807, § 1 348 (codified as amended at 18 U . s.c. § 1 348 ( Supp. I I 2002» .
74 § 302 ( codified as amended at 1 5 U .S.c. § 7241 (Supp. II 2002» .
70 § 404 ( codified as amended at 1 5 U .s.c. § 7268 ( Supp. II 2002» .
76 Securities Exch ange Act of l 934, 1 5 U.s.c. § 78u ( 2000) .
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eral code. Together, th e explicit crimes in title 1 8 of the U.S. Code
and the implicit ones h i dden in the securities laws comprise a vast,
ongoing effort to define the contours of business morality.
As with fe de ral vice laws, most of these provisions will be enforced
both rarely and idiosyn cratically. Mter an initial flurry of ac tivity,
companies and their executives will adjust to the new provisions.
Companies and executives that are inclined to push the envelope or
cheat will invariably find ways to maneuver around the new rules,
much as Enron did in designing the off-balance-sheet p artnerships it
used to hide liabilities.
When regulators do try to enforce the morality refle cted in th e
corporate misconduct provisions of the federal code, the result is of
te n chaos. Martha Stewart's brush with the insider trading rules is a
telling illustration . As construed by the SEC and Supreme Court,
even if the defendant owes no duty to the company whose stock is be
ing traded, she is liable _if she buys or sells stock in violation of any
kind of duty to anyone . / I In Stewart' s case, the theory was that her
broker violated his du ties as a broker when he told Stewart that the
founder of I mClone was selling his stock, and that Stewart inherited
this duty because she was a "tippe e . " What Stewart did was immoral ,
but it did not fit within any coherent, realistically enforceable theory
78
of insider trading.
Regulators could never enforce these standards
against more than the tiniest percentage of violators, which means
that the real moral of the Stewart saga is this : don ' t be Martha Stew
art-don ' t be the kind of famous , con trove rsial person wh om regula
tors migh t single out for enforcement. Moralist criminal law turns
out not to be particularly moral.
As th e law has grown more moralist, academic legal literature has
devoted eve r more atte ntion to expressive theories of law, particularly
criminal law. Expressivism and moralism are a natural pair: both
hold that law exists not just to govern, but to teach.79 Robert Ellickson

77 See United States v. O' Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 653 ( 1 997) (endorsing a "misappropriation"
theory of i nsider trading liability) .
78 In Stewart's case, the difficul ty was compounded by the perception that her broker's be
havior was not unusual-that is, that many brokers tell their clients about developments such as
a sale of stock by a high-level execu tive of a company in which the client owns stock. If this per
ception is accurate, the brokers' duty is a duty in name, but not one that is followed in practice.
79 Compare Dan
1. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L . REv. 349,
351 ( 1 997) (" Given the power of social i n fluence, laws that shape individuals' perceptions of
each others' beliefs and intentions . . . may often turn out to be the most cost-effective means of
deterring c � e ." ) , Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theo?) of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REv.
1 649 , 1 69 1 ( 2000) [h ereinafter McAdams, Focal Point Theo·ry] (discussing the " labeling power" o f
law) , and Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L.
REv. 338, 341 ( 1 997) [herei nafter McAdams, Norms] ( advocating "the use of norms in economic
analysis of law" ) , with William J . Stun tz, Christian Legal Themy, 1 1 6 HARv. L . REv. 1 707, 1 733-34
( 2003) ( reviewing CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVES 0 LEGAL TJ IOCGHT ( Michael W. McConnell et al.
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famously wrote about the way the farme rs of Shasta County, Califor
nia generated a system of "orde r without l aw"-the title of Ellickson ' s
wonderful book-through the inculcation and application of social
0
norms. 8 An important strand of legal scholarship h as turned Ellick
son ' s insight o n its head, arguing that while social norms govern p ri
vate conduct, legal rules shape social norms. These law-and-norms
scholars, led by Dan Kahan and Richard McAdams, have focused
much of their attention on criminal law and on the way different le
gal rules can p ro duce healthier norms . S l
This is moralism with different terminology. Instead of saying that
criminal law does and should teach good morals , norms scholars say
that the law should p romote healthy norms-different language but
th e same concept. Also, norms theories face the same basic p roblem
as moralist the ories of criminal law: there is too much immorality.
When legal codes try to play the role of moral codes, the result is that
law ceases to function as law. We do not mean to suggest that the
criminal law has no role to play in reinforcing healthy mo ral values.
But p u rely symbolic laws have a very different effe ct. The more s pace
the federal criminal code cove rs , the greater the ratio of crimes to
prose cutions; the greater that ratio is , the more prosecutors-no t the
law-define the bounds of criminal liability. This might not be so if
prosecutors simply prosecuted violators randomly , but enforcement
discre tion n ever works that way. Law enforcers draw the lines they
like , or use their line-drawing P?we r to extract information or to
"take down" famous defendants . 82 Whateve r the enforc ement pat
tern, the message the law sends is bound to be different than the
message embodied in the relevan t statute . That is not likely to teach
good morals or p romote healthy norms, and it is not likely to delight
anyone 's soul.
Fraud prosecutions send the message that leading politician s , like
3
Clinton or Henry Cisneros, 8 and celebrities like Stewart, are subject

eds., 200 1 » (discussing a kind of moralism that "begins with th e claim that law's highest goal is
to identify classes of behavior that are not j ust socially wasteful or inefficient but evil, and then
to stamp them out" ) , and Smntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, supra note 4 , at 1 840-4 1 ("The great
difficulty with [morals crimes] may be too little moralism. As the name suggests, m orals
crimes . . . depend more than do other crimes on the strength of the n o rms that undergird
them. At the same time, those norms are more fragile than for o ther crimes.") .
80

ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW:

How

N EIGHBORS SETTLE D ISPUTES 1 3- 1 20

( 1 99 1 ) .
81

See, e. g., Kahan, supra note 79; McAdams, Focal Point Theory, supra note 79; McAdams,
Norms, supra note 79. For an excellent critique of expressive theories of law, see M atthew D .
Adler, Expressive Theories o fLaw: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U . PA. L . REv. 1 363 ( 2000 ) .
82

See, e.g., Richman & Stu n tz, supra note 3 (discussing the prosecutions of AI Capone, Mar
tha Stewart, Bill Clinton, and other prominent defendants ) .
8:1

For a discussion of the prosecution of Cisneros, see Will iam
Law 's Patholo,l!J, 10 1 MICH. L. REv. 828, 833 & n 2 4 (200 2 ) .
.
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to one s tandard (anything we can prove , we prosecute ) , while the rest
of the pop ulation is subj e ct to another, or to no standard at alL
Prosecutions for immigratio n violations send the message that those
suspected of terrorism wil l be convicted of anything the governmen t can
pin on them. Drug prosec utions send the message that one norm
applies on city s treets and another in suburban malls-and, to a large
extent, that one norm applies to Mrican-Americans and another to
whites. Those messages do indeed te ach , but what they te ach most
effe ctively is cynicism about legal institutions.
Notwithstanding legal theorists ' optimism about law's ability to
teach wisdom or express our society ' s highest ideals , th ere is no rea
son to believe that criminal codes can accomplish these goals. VVhen
lawmakers try , the effort usually backfires. Prohibitio n did not pro
duce an alcoh ol-free culture any more than contemporary law en
forcement crusades have produced a culture that is drug-fre e . ( I t
seems closer to th e truth to say th at our culture is drug-obsessed, per
haps in response to the law ' s ceaseless effo rts to fine-tune what sub
Criminal bans on
stances Americans can and cannot consume . )
abortio n did not reinforce the social norm against that p rac tic e ; on
the con trary, the norm fell apart while th ose bans were still in place.84
Even in the realm of civil justic e , legal rules do not seem to move the
culture in produc tive directions. As Michael Klarman ' s fine book on
race and the Supreme Court shows , the greatest effect of Brown v.
85
Board of Education was to prom p t still greate r intransigence on the
part of South ern segregatio nists. 8
That last example deserves a li ttle elaboration. Plainly, law played
a central role in the civil rights movement; equally plainly, law made a
difference-a large difference-in American life. I t seems fair to say
that, at least to some degree, the landmark civil righ ts legislation of
the 1 960s taugh t racial toleration . All of which sounds inconsistent
with the claim that law governs best when i t seeks only to govern , not
to teach people how to live . The inc onsistency is smaller than it first
appears. Neither Brown v. Board of Education nor the Civil Rights Ac t
of 1 9 64 87 is chiefly responsible for teaching white Americans to treat

84 Common estim ates of the number of illegal abortions during the 1960s, before Roe v.
Wade, 4 1 0 U.S. 1 1 3 ( 1 973 ) , range from 500,000 to 1 . 5 million. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COU RTS BRI NG ABOUT SOGIAL CHAl'\lGE? 353-55 & tbLA1 ( 1 99 1 ) (analyzing
the impact of Roe v. Wade, taking into account histo rical estimates of illegal abortions) .
85

86

347 U.S. 483 .,954) .

See MICHAEL]' KLA.RMAN, FROYljlM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT Al'\l D THE
STRUGGLE: FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 385-42 1 (2004) (discussing and analyzing the righ tward
movement in the post-BTOwn Southern politics of race, and noting the ten dency of p reviously
mode rate politicians to embrace racial extremism ) .
87 Pub. L.
o . 88-352, 78 Stat. 2 4 1 (codi fi ed as amended a t 42 USc. § § 2000a to h-6
( 2000 » .
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their black neighbors like equals . The key teaching was done in the
decade between those two legal events by Martin Luther King, Jr. and
by the movement that he led. King and other civil rights leaders gave
violent white segregationists the opportunity to show the world who
and what they were . The world watched, and the re sult was an
emerging national consensus in favor of civil rights for Mrican
Americans.88 The civil rights legislation of the 1 9 60s did n o t cause
that consensus. Actually, causation ran the other way: changed
minds and hearts among No rthern whi tes (and more than a few
Southern whites, as we ll) led Congress to conclude that support for
civil rights was both mo rally sound and politically advantage ous .
To be sure , civil-rights legislation matte red; it was a strong force
for good. But the reasons why it worked so well do not suggest opti
mism about contemporary efforts to use law to advance moral agen
das . The most important reason is that the key pieces of legislation
the 1 964 Ac t and the Voting Righ ts Ac t of 1 965 89-had direct, tangi
ble consequences that did not depend on discretionary decisions of
police offic ers or prosecutors . Jim Crow laws we re invalidated. 90 Vo t
ing rules had to be pre-cleare d with the Justice Department.91 Most
imp ortan t of all, victims of discrimination could sue and seek mone
tary relief from their victimizers. 92
These tangible conseque nces m eant that the law in action-the
law that ordinary citizens experienced, the law that redressed wrongs
and punished wrongdoers-was , in all essentials , the same as the law
on the books . For the most part, civil rights law functioned as law:
defining righ ts, wro ngs, and remedies. That is ve ry different from the
role law plays in most regulatory regimes, civil as well as criminal.
Not coincidentally, civil rights law also reinforced healthy mo ral mes
sages that the larger society had already begun to absorb. Perhaps
the lesson is this: law can indeed teach, but only wh en its chief object
lies elsewh ere. I n governance as in life , most people learn by exam
ple. Moral messages are more likely to be received, and less likely to

>!I! One of the best accounts is Taylor Branch's monumental three volume history of the King
years. See generally TAYLO R BRAl"'l CH, PARTING THE WATERS: AMERICA I. THE KIl\G YEARS 1 954-63
( 1 989 ) ; TAYLO R BRANCH, PILLAR OF FIRE: fuvlERJCA IN THE KING YEARS 1963-65 ( 1 998 ) ; TAYLOR
BRANCH, AT CANAAl'l ' S EDGE: fuVlERICA IN THE KING YEARS 1 965-68 ( 2006 ) .
89 P ub . L . No. 89- 1 1 0 , 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 4 2 U.s.C. § § 1 9 7 1-74e ( 2000» .
( prohibit
90 See Civil Rights Act § 202 ( codified as amended at 42 U.s.c. § 2000a-l ( 2000»
ing discrimination and desegregation "purport [ing] to be required by any law, statute, ordi
nance, regulation, rule, or order of a State or any agency or political subdivision thereof' ) .
91 See Voting Rights Act § 5 (codified as amended at 42 U.s.c. § 1 973c ( 2000»
(barring
changes in voting rules by covered jurisdictions absent either judicial review or advance permis
sion from the Justice Departme nt) .
92 See, e.g. , Civil Rights Act § 706 (g) ( codified as amended at 42 U.s.c. § 2000e-5 ( 2000»
(granting courts discretion to fashion equitable relief, including monetary bac k-pay awards, for
employment discrimination ) .
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be garbled, when th e message is acted out, not just written In code
books and case rep o rters .
All of which is to say that law works best when its ambitions are
modest. Humility turns out to be a better regulatory strategy than ar
rogance. Identifying the most destruc tive wrongs, doing so in terms
that allow for fair, accurate adjudication , matching the scope of the
criminal code to th e resources of the police forces and prose cutors '
offices that must enforce i t-these are achievable goals. Th ey are also
worthy goals: a society whose criminal law meets these obj e c tives is
likely to have a criminal j ustice syste m that con trols crime and does
justice . The grander ambitions our law seems to have-to define a
code of proper business p ractice or prop er alc ohol and drug use and
to shape moral norms more generally-are not achievable . They are
proper j obs for ethicists and philosoph ers , or perhaps doctors and
economists, but not for lawye rs and judges .93
Not coinciden tally, they are also proper subj ects fo r the moral law
about which Jesus preached in the Sermon on the Mount. That law
makes for ve ry good morals , but very bad positive law. I t is a lesson
our secular legal system would do well to learn .
i

I I I . T H E RELATIONSHIP BETWE EN GOD ' S LAw AND MAN ' S
Conservative Christians could stand to learn the same lesson. The
New Testament makes abundan tly clear that law cannot save souls;
salvation must come th rough other means and from another Source.
In the apostle Paul ' s letters , law is not th e mechanism of salvation ;
rather, law shows the need of it.94 Paul repeatedly warns Christians
about the dangers of converting their faith into a moral code ,95 just as
Jesus condemned the Pharisees for doing the same th ing to their own
faith and thus weighing down the people with burdens too heavy to

93 Noah Feldman 's recent proposal to "offer greater lati tude for religious speech and sym
bols in public debate, but also impose a stricter ban on state financing of religious institutions
and activities," is problematic for closely related reasons. Noah Feldman, il Church-State Solution,
.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2005, § 6 ( Magazine ) , at 28; see also NOAH FELDi'vIAN, D IVlDED BY GOD:
AMERICA'S CH URCH-STATE PROBLEM-AND WHAT WE SHOULD Do ABOUT IT (2005) ( providi ng
historical context for the co nflict over the proper line between church and state and proposing
reconciliation between the posi tions of "values evangelism" and "legal secularism" through ex
panding acceptance of sym bolic religious expression while enforcing rigid formal separation
between religious institutions and the state ) . As a resolution of the First Amendment culture
wars, Fel dman's proposal seems to us exactly backwards. Because symbolic legislation (such as
putting "In God We Trust" on coins) does not have tangible consequences, lawmakers are far
too quick to embrace it. In the absence of real consequences, there is simply not en ough of a
check on bad lawmaking.

94 l1l.g. , Romans 7 : 7-25 (elaborating on th e difference between God's law and man 's law) .

9'>

E.g. , Galatians 3: � 0-29 (distinguishing the law from the covenant between God and Abra
ham ) .
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carry.96 One might expe c t professing Ch ristians to be especially at
tun e d to the dange rs of legal moralism. Judging from contemporary
cultu re-wars debates, we are n o t. The heart of the problem is a ten
dency to confuse God' s law with man 's. Those of us who believe in a
divin e moral law are regularly tempted to try to write that law into
our much-less-than-divine code books.
Among American evangelicals, this tendency was re inforced by
the j u di cially mandated legalization of abortion in 1 973, which galva
nized theologically conservative Catholics and Protestants alike and
spurred a long, still-ongoing campaign to flip the legal switch back.97
The reasoning was and is quite s traightforward: abortion is a serious
I t should therefore be outlawed, not legally protected.
wron g.
Whether o r not one finds this logic pe rsuasive , it is bedeviled by a
striking irony in the prac tical world of American politics: the cam
paign against abortion seems to have been strength ened, not weak
ened, by the fact that pro-life evangelicals no longer have the law on
their side . In the 1 9 60s, abortion was a crim e, and its public image
was largely defined by the gruesome deaths . that women risked when
they sought illegal, black-market abortions.98 Thanks in large part to
that image , the campaign to l iberalize abortion laws prospered. Since
Roe v . Wade, 99 the public face of abortion h as switched sides . In place
of deaths from back-alley abortions, public attention focuses on
death s of almost-born infants in partial birth abortions. loo Just as the
first set of deaths were not representative of ordinary experience un
der the law that preceded Roe v. Wade, partial birth abortions are not
representative of the mass of abortions that have taken place since
that case. But different laws produce different public scandals .
D ifferent sc andals produce different politics. When the public is
sharply divided about the rights and wrongs of some class of conduct,
both sides of the debate will strive to use extreme and inflammatory
cases against one another. But only one side will succeed. The law
gives that devastatingly powerful weapon to the side that loses the legal
debate , be they abortion righ ts proponents in the 1 9 60s or pro-life
advocates today. \Nh en even first-trimester abortions were cnmes,
9U

Matthew 23:2-36 (quoting Jesus' condemnation of the teachers of the law and Ph arisees ) .
97 T h e argume n t in this paragraph is developed i n greater detail i n Will iam J. Stuntz, Self
Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REv. 1 8 7 1 , 1 886-89 (2000 ) .

98 See id. at 1 887-88 ("In 1 960, Newsweek ran a story titled The Abortion Racket, estimati ng that
five thousand women died each year from illegal abortions . . . . Th [is] and other accounts con
tributed to the grmving sense in some circles that criminal abortion laws were wrong, even bar
baric." (internal citations omitted » .
99 4 1 0 U.S. 1 1 3 ( 1 973) .
100
On e measure of the com parative salience of back-alley abortions and partial birth abor
tions is references to each in the print media. A recent search (conducted March 22, 2006) of
Westlaw's "All News" database found 1 80 1 stories mentioning back-alley abortions since January
1 , 1 990. With partial birth abortion, the database stopped counting at 1 0,000 stories.
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partial birth abortions did not exist. Now that abortion is a constitu
tional righ t, deaths from back-alley abortions are much less common
than they once were . IOl ( Even in the 1 9 60s, the� were less common
than the popular press led people to believe . I 2 ) Both time s, th e
weapon-the ability of a vocal minority to reference cases or statutes
to inflame c itizens-played a large role in turn ing public opinion.
Support fo r legalized abortion grew in th e 1 9 60s, just as opp osition to
it has grown since the early 1 990s . 1 03 The consequences can be seen
not just in political rhetoric, but also in prac tical conduct. The num
ber of abortions rose s teeply in the years leading uB to Roe. ,o'l That
number has declined stee ply in the years since 1 9 80. 05 The abortion
rate co uld well be lowe r today than it was the year before Roe was de
cided. When the relevant legal territory is morally con tested, the
law's weaponry te nds to wound those who wie ld it. Legal victory p ro�
duces cultural and political defeat.
Evangelicals-especially conservative evan gelicals-have been
similarly united in opposing gambling and h ave treated legal prohibi
tio ns as the principal tool in the cultural debate on that subject.
Evangelicals have comprised much of the opposition to lo ttery initia
tives in South Carolina, Alabama, and elsewhere; they are the most
visible opponents of the recent movement to allow race tracks to in
1 06
The cover of a recent issue of a publication
troduce slot machines.
of the evangelical group, the Pennsylvania Family I nstitute , warned of
the "false promises of funding schools and social programs with ca
sino gambling" and urged its members to circulate citizens' petitions

101

Lucinda M. Finley, The Story of Roe v. Wade: From a Garage Sale for Women 's Lib, to the Su
preme COUlt, to Political Turmoil, in CONSTITUTIONAL L\W STORIES 359, 40 1 (Michael C. Dorf ed.,
2004) ("The principal practical consequence of Roe was to dramatically increase the safety of
abortion.") (citing Center for Disease Control statistics) .
1 02
See Jeffrey Rosen, The D(ty After Roe, ATLANTIC M O NT H LY, June 2006, at 56, 62 (suggesting
that articles in Newsweek and The Saturday Evening Post exaggerated by "at least a factor of
ten " the num ber of deaths from abortions ) .
103
The debate over partial birth abortion is not the only source of the change in public atti
tudes. The increasingly widespread availability of sonograms has likewise been used by an ti
abortion groups in attempting to strengthen opposition to abortion. See, e.g. , Neela Baneljee,
Church Groups Tum to Sonogram to Turn Women from Abortion, N.Y. T IM ES Feb. 2, 200 5, at A i (dis
cussing church groups' purchases of ultrasound machines) .
,

104

See ROSENBERG, supra note 84, at 353-55 ( l isting and discussing th e estimated number o f
illegal abortions performed each year up until t h e Roe decision ) .
105

See Lawrence B. Finer & Stanley K. Henshaw, Ab01tion Incidence and Seroices in the United
States in 2000, PERSP. 0 SEXUAL & REPROD. HEALT H , Jan.-Feb. 2003, at 6, 8 tbl . l (showing a
twen ty-seven percent decline in the abortion rate between 1 980 and 2000 ) , available at http : / /
www .guttmacher.org/pubs/journals/3500603.pdf.
106 Evangelical opposition to gambling is discussed in more detail in David A. Skeel Jr. , VVhen
Gambling a n.tJ lvI(l1·kets Converge, in THEOLOGY AND THE LIBERAL STATE (forthcoming 2006).
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and lobby their lawmakers to op pose Pennsylvania legislation that
107
would authorize race track slots.
Judging by th e las t century of criminal law enforcement, gam
blin g's religious opponents may have bet on the wrong horse . At
le ast since th e early twentieth century, federal and state criminal
codes h ave banned most forms of gambling. Those criminal proh ibi
tions may have taugh t some Ame ricans that gambling is wrong, but
they seem to h ave taught millions of others to ignore the law ' s com
mands. Far from disappearing in the face of such prosc rip tions,
gambling simply wen t u nderground.
Bookmake rs and numbers
I
racke ts took the place of casinos and legal lotteries . DS Gambling was
too ubiquitous for the government to punish across the board, so the
line between what was forbidden and what was tolerate d was a matter
of prosecutors' discretion . lo9 In practice, the line differed depending
on the class of the customers . Police might raid the numbers rackets
that flourished in poor immigran t and working-class neighborhoods,
but they mostly left upscale bookmake rs alone. l I D This class-base d
disc rimination was a rational response to limited enforcement re
sources: it was far easier to police numbers games, which were often
out in the open, than to track down more discreet bookmakers and
Going after lower-class gambling made
their well-h eeled clie n ts.
sense as a way to get the biggest bang fo r th e buck. But th e bang
turned out not to be as big as it seemed: th e perception that gam
bling was a crime if you lived in the wrong nei Rhborhood bred con
tempt for the laws that did the criminalizing. 1 I n turn , this con
tempt eroded the very moral principles on which the proh ibition was
based.
If evangelicals could assemble a majori ty coalition in the current
environment-resisting or even reversing th e expansion of racetrack
gambling, for instance, or heading off new lottery ini tiatives-we
migh t see a similar dynamic at work. Millions of Americans do not
believe gambling is immoral / 1 2 and a wave of new gambling proh ibi107

Clem Boyd, Slots faT Tots Would Gamble Away OUT FutuTe', PA. FAMS. & SCHOOLS, Spring
2002, at 4. The campaign was to no avail, as the legislation passed. See, e.g. , Editorial, Pennsy l
vania 's Slots Sleaze, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2005, at A24 (describing and criticizing the effects of the
l egislation) .
IO�
See Stun tz, Race, Class, and Drugs, supm note 4, at 1804 & nn. 1 1- 12 (discussi ng persistent
trends in gambling over tim e ) .
11"-'
See id. at 1819-24 (discussing the peculiar policing an d prosecutorial concerns involved in
consensual crimes li ke gambling) .
1 10
See id. at 1804-19 (discussin g the different effects of consensual crimes on neighborhoods
of different classes) .
III
See id. a t 1804, 1807, 1825-26.
1 12
See, e.g., Skeel, supm note 106 (manuscrip t at 1 4 n.29, on file wi th University of Pen nsyl
van ia Journal of Constitutional Law) (citing a 2003 Barna poll finding that sixty-one percent of
all Americans, bu t only twen ty-seven percent of evangelicals, approve of gambling) .
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tions could increase that number if those on the margin recoil at th e
effort to legislate morality or the inconsistent enforcement of the
prohibition. This points to anoth e r dange r in trying to make the
statute books mirror the law of God: the enterprise distracts religious
believers from other, more limited efforts that migh t command wide
spread suppo rt. If they were not so c losely linke d with the campaign
to prohibit gambling, evan gelicals might speak with greater moral au
thori ty when criticizing, say, state governments' all-out effo rts to
promote their own lotte ries. Th e same states that force welfare re
cipients to work for their bread also run adve rtisements featu ring lot
tery winners bragging that " I ' ll never have to work another day in my
l ife . " l J 3 Religious believers sometimes cri ticize these cynical cam
paigns to put more cash in government coffers, but the message is
muddled by the not-unfounded perception that their real goal is to
use the law's sword to outlaw all gambling.
Th e tendency of legal moralism to backfire extends beyond cul
turally contentious issues like abortion and gambling. The world of
corporate finance tends to prompt a moralism of the left, with politi
cally liberal Christians seeking to enforce God ' s law in corporate
boardrooms. Jim Wallis, editor of the liberal evangelical magazine
Sojourners and author of the best-selling book God 's Politics, praises
Congress for its recent efforts to promote corporate responsibility:
The Sen ate finally passed unanimously a series o f acc o u n ting and
co rporate regulato ry measu res considerably tougher than wha t the p resi
d e n t h ad suggeste d .

They i n cluded, by a 9 7-to-0 vote , a new chapte r i n

the criminal code that makes any "scheme o r artifice" to defraud stock-

. .
I O f:C
lense .
holders a cnmma

114

Wallis th en quotes an d endorses Senator Patrick Leahy's assessment:
If you steal a $500 te levision set, you can go to j ai l . Ap paren tly if you steal
$500 million from your corporation and yo u r pe nsion h o l de rs and eve ry
one else, th en nothing happens. [The cor� 9rate responsibility legisla
tio n ] makes sure some t h i n g will happen . . . . l:>

1 13

The "never work another day" ad ran in Pennsylvania. In a notoriolls New Yo rk ad, a
mother made fun of her daughter for studying so hard to try to earn a college scholarship. No
need to worry, the mother suggested; sh e'd taken care of the fami ly's financial probl ems by buy
ing a lottery ticket. J OHN R . HILL & GARY PALM ER, S.C. POLICY COUNCIL EDUC. FOU N D . , GOING
FOR BROKE: T HE Eco, OMIC AJ'\iO SOCIAL IMPACT OF A SO UTH CAROL! 'A LOTTERY 26 (Gerry Dick
inson ed. , 2000 ) (describing the New York ad) ,
1 14
JIM WALLIS, GOD'S POLITICS: WHY THE RIGHT GETS IT WRONG AND THE LEFT DOESN 'T GET
IT: A NEW VISION FOR FAITH AND POLITICS I N AMERICA 263 (2005 ) . This is the catch-all criminal
an tifraud provision discussed earlier. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 1 07-204, Sec.
807, § 1 348, 1 1 6 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in 18 U S c . § 1 348 (Supp. I I 2002) ) ; supm text
accompanying note 68 .
115
WALLIS, supm note 1 1 4, at 263 (quoting Senator Leahy as reported in Sean Gonsalves,
WTO Protesters Appear Prophetic, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, July 1 6, 2002, at B5 ) . Wallis's dis
cussion of the corporate scandals draws on and develops a commentary he wrote at the h eigh t
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The suggestion is that laws can be used as an instrument to teach the
next generation of corporate executives h ow to behave and reshape
corporate culture .
I t isn ' t like ly to work out that way. Title 1 8 of the United States
Code already includes several hundred laws banning various kinds of
I 16
fraud and misrepresen tation.
Adding a few more is like adding new
rules to the tax code: corporate crooks, like rich taxpayers, will pay
their lawyers to find new ways to maneuver around th e rules. Nearly
everyone agrees that th ere was a serious breakdown in corporate
Ame rica at the outset of the twe nty-first century and that corporate
eth ics were a large part of the problem. But new criminal p rohibi
tions are more l ikely to undermine managers ' sense of moral respon
sibility than to promote it. Every parent understands this point:
give n a choice between saying "don ' t hurt your sister" and "here is a
list of fifteen ways you migh t hurt your siste r-don ' t do any of these , "
wise parents o p t for the first approach. Most children, when they are
presented with a list of fifte en things not to do, will quickly come up
with a sixteenth that is not on the list. 117 Detailed codes that try to de
fine misconduct comprehensively tend to produce the same re ac tion.
Complying with the law becomes an exercise i n ticket-punching, fol
lowing me chan ical legal formulae . Regulated actors exe rcise their
creativity by looking for ways to evade legal norms-like taxpayers fill
ing out their tax forms every April 1 5 , trying all the while to hold on
to every penny they can.
"\Then corporate regulation looks like th e tax code , corporate ex
ecutives respond like taxpaye rs . Given a list of dos and don ' ts , many
will find themselves thinking more about what they can get away with
and less about what is honorable and righ t. Rather than cultivati ng a
sense of moral responsibility, a comprehensive set of rules may simply
function as an obstacle course , a set of barriers around which corpo
I 18
As with legal efforts to resolve con tenrate officers must maneuver.

of the scandals. Jim Wallis, Hearts & NIinds: 77�e Sin of Enron, SOJOUR.!'-J ERS MAG., Mar.-Apr.
2002, at 7, 8 ( "Maybe this time we will demand that stronger stock trading regulations, account
ing regulations, and a complete campaign finance reform overhaul be at the top of the political
agenda. " ) .
116
See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
1 17
Note that the opposite strategy-the one used by parents-is problematic when trans
planted to the law. Vague prohibitions like "cause no harm" grant broad discretion to prosecu
tors and regulators. That is as likely to backfire as is a long list of irregularly enforced rules.
The lesson is not that law regulates best through standards rather than rules, but that law makes
a poor parent. The best parents are good moral educators, which legislators and judges are
not.
l IS
The most widely debated provision of the recent corporate responsibility reforms-a re
quirement that compan ies put an extensive internal control system in place and that the CEO
certifies th e firm's efforts to do so-is a good illustration. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 1 5 U.s.c.
§ 7262 (Supp. II 2002) ( establishing the requirements for internal control p rovisions) . Much of
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tious issues in our social life , legal efforts to define and enforce a
code of e conomic morality p roduce a kind of reverse alchemy, turn
ing the gold of good morals into dross.
It gets worse . Prosecutors cannot hope to enforce white-collar
criminal law across the board; they must be selective . The most obvi
ous way to select targets is to investigate every high-profile corporate
bankrup tcy. The moral me ssage becomes not "don ' t lie" but "don ' t
fail"-n o t the best message to send budding entrepreneurs .
Why do evangelical Christians find it s o hard to resist th e attrac
tions of legal moralism? One answer is h isto rical. Early in the twen
tieth century, evangelicals disengage d from American politics, partly
in response to the sp read of secular modernismJ l9 and partly in reac
tio n to the debacle of Prohibition and its re peal . Starting in th e
1 940s, evangelical leade rs , many of them connected to Christianity
Today, the principal voice of conservative evan gelicalism , began call
ing for a renewed commitment on the part of believers to e ngage and
influence the culture around them. "From Carl He nry and Harold
Ockenga in the 1 940s and 1 950s," as Christian Smith puts it, "to
Francis Sc haeffe r and Mark Hatfield in the 1 9 60s and 1 9 70s, to
Charles Colson and An th ony Campolo in the 1 980s and 1 990s, evan
gelicals have been driven by a vision of redemp tive world transforma
,,
tion. 12o If the end is to transform a law-saturated culture like con
te mporary America' s , legal reform seems a natural means. Debates
over legal limits on abortion , gambling, and Enron-style corporate
immorality become tools for healing a spiri tually diseased society.
But the cure risks worsening the disease . A legal culture that in
vites selec tive enforcement ( or no enforcement at all) of con trover
sial laws makes it all too easy to enact such laws. Religious moralists
need not win th e culture in order to enact their preferred moral vi
sion into law; on the con trary, culture and law can follow separate
paths. Law becomes large ly symbolic: the vast federal criminal law of
misrepresentation goes unenforced, save for th e occasional Martha
Stewart or Scooter Libby on whom ambitious prosecutors train their
sigh ts . 12 1 That state of affairs pleases neither moralists nor libertari-

the discussion has centered on the cost of implemen ting internal controls, bu t the more lasting
concern is that the requirement will simply function as another hoop through wh ich corporate
managers must jump. There is a danger that many companies will simply hire a new executive,
th e "corporate com pliance officer," but that nothing else will change. Indeed, in some compa
nies, the formal procedu res could be used to mask a poisonolls corporate cultu re.
1 19

For an excellent account that emphasizes the effects of this development on evangelical
politics, see GEORGE M. MARSD EN, FUNDAMENTALISM AND AMERlCAN CULTURE: THE SHAPING OF
TwENTIETH-CEI TURY EvANGELICALISM 1870-1925 ( 1 980 ) .
120
121

CHRISTIAN SMITH , AMERICAN EVANGELICALISM: EMBATILED AND TH RIVING 1 78-79 ( 1 998) .

Scooter Libby, the Chief of Staff to Vice President Dick Cheney, was indicted in 2005 fo r
allegedly lying to prosecutors about the leaked iden tity of CIA employee Valerie Plame.
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ans . The controversy that surrounded Terri Schiavo ' s death in th e
spring of 2005 , together with the federal legislation and litigation that
2
preceded it, is the latest example of the p henomenon . 1 2 It wil l not
be the last.
The problem with the Schiavo legislation was not that the subj ect
matter-the circumstances under which doctors may remove feeding
tubes from comatose patients-is inherently inappropriate or incom
patible with wise legal regulation . Rather, the problem was that even
those supp orting the regulation did not wish to apply it to any cases
but Schiavo ' s . That is a recipe for bad lawmaking. If those of us who
believe that Te rri Schiavo deserved better than she got cannot per
suade our fellow citizens to require that all those in Schiavo ' s circum
stances receive better treatment, we should not seek, and lawmakers
should not offer, "rules" that are not rules at all, but merely symbolic
("hypocritical" might be a better word) affirmations of norms that the
c itizenry is unwilling to live by.
The Schiavo case is an extreme version of a sadly common phe
nomenon. Legal moralists seek to ban some class of conduct that
most of the population either wishes to engage in or is happy to tol
erate . In a society that truly honored the rule of law, such bans could
not pass muste r, because the laws in question could neve r be fully en
forced. I n our system, such bans are a common means of political
marke t segmen tation , an attempt to mollify religious conservatives
without offending se cular libertarians . That result should displease
both groups. Legal moralism does not, in the end, advance the In
terests of moralists-or anyone else, for that matter.
In short, legal moralism is nearly always counterproductive . In
Christian te rms, it is also deeply wrong. Jesus ' definitions of adultery
and murder proved that immorality and illegali ty cannot and must
12
not be coextensive . 3 God ' s law reigns over a broad empire that
man ' s law cannot hope to govern. Good moral principles are often
vague and open-ended, and they reach into every nook and cranny of
our lives and our thoughts . Le gal principles that have these qualities
only serve to invite arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Arbi
trariness and discrimination in turn i nvite contempt for the law.
Moral education becomes an exercise in educating the public in bad
morals . Th e same thing happens if lawmakers choose a long list of
rigid rules in place of vague moral principles, as our experience with
122

The Schiavo case has already generated an enormous amount of writing. For one of the
better arguments in favo r of keeping Schiavo alive and for federal intervention to that end, see
Peggy Noonan , In Love With Death, OPINION ]', Mar. 24, 2005, h ttp:// www .opinionjournal .com/
columnists/pnoonan/ ? id= 1 1 0006460. For a discussion o f how that case is likely to prove a self�
inflicted wound for conservative Christians, see John C. Danforth, In the Narne of Politics, N .Y.
TIMES, Mar. 30, 2005 , at A17.
123

See Matthew 5 : 2 1 -22 (discussing murder) ; Matthew 5 : 27-28 (discussing ad ultery) .
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trying to define and enforce corporate morality proves . Targets of
those rules focus on the rules themselves, on maneuvering through
legal m inefields instead of exercising moral j udgment. The law de
ters the very thing it seeks to promote. It is hard to avoid th e conclu
sion that the law must draw lines not betwe en right and wrong but
be twe en the most destructive and verifiable wrongs, and everyth ing
else .
And mixing God ' s law and man ' s law may have other unfortunate
consequences: distorting religious believers ' understanding of the
divine law eve n as it distorts the publi c ' s approach to th e laws of code
books and court decisions. D istortion runs, in other words, in both
directions. Even as we try to write morality into the statute books, we
may be te mpted to turn God ' s law into a list of purposeless rules, a
kind of Biblical ve rsion of the Internal Reve nue Code . That is pre
cisely the te ndency that Christ criticized in th e Pharisees of h is time
the te ndency to focus on rules rather than relationsh ip with the one
true God, a te nde ncy that robbed God ' s law both of i ts vas tn ess and
of its delight.
Conflating God ' s law and man ' s law thus does violence to both . It
makes far too much of man 's law, and far too little of God 's. This re
alization leads to a surprising implication about contemporary
American politics : the deep divide between moralists and l ibe rtarians
may be needless, th e result more of theological error than of spiritual
disagreement. Libe rtarians seek to minimize formal legal restraints
on private conduct. That age nda should hold some appeal fo r wise
moralists , at least if the moralists are Christian . After all , the rule of
law is a moral good in Christian terms. And th e rule of law is likely to
be honored best where legal restrain ts are most modest. The rule of
good mo rals , meanwh ile , must be honored-if it is to be honored at
all-in the hearts and minds of the citizenry. Not in its courthouses.

